Wake v. State

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

JOHN ADAM WAKE, Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent.

No. 1 CA-SA 26-0050
FILED 05-26-2026

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2009-173414-001-DT
The Honorable AnnieLaurie Van Wie, Judge Pro Tempore

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Phoenix
By Amanda Weaver, Daniel J. Inglese
Counsel for Petitioner

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Quinton S. Gregory
Counsel for Respondent

OPINION

Presiding Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Judge David B. Gass and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.
 WAKE v. STATE
Opinion of the Court

B E C K E, Judge:

¶1 John Adam Wake (“Wake”) seeks special action relief from
the superior court’s dismissal of his petition to seal criminal records under
A.R.S. § 13-911. We accept special action jurisdiction, but deny relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2011, Wake pled guilty to one count of solicitation to
commit possession of dangerous drugs for sale, a Class 4 felony. Wake’s
sentence was suspended and he was placed on 18 months’ probation,
ordered to pay various restitution, fines, and fees, and ordered to complete
360 hours of community service.

¶3 In 2013, the superior court entered an order of discharge from
probation. The order noted that Wake did not comply with his financial or
community restitution conditions, noting he had completed just 10 of the
ordered 360 community service hours. Even so, the adult probation
department did not file a petition to revoke his probation because Wake
had not engaged in any continued criminal activity. In discharging Wake
from probation, the court also approved a criminal restitution order of
$2,070, which Wake satisfied in 2014.

¶4 In 2025, Wake petitioned to seal his criminal record under
A.R.S. § 13-911. The State objected because Wake did not complete all of his
community service hours. The State argued that because A.R.S. § 13-911(E)
requires all nonmonetary terms of probation to be complete before filing,
the petition should be denied.

¶5 The superior court dismissed the petition for failure to
provide sufficient information because Wake had not submitted records
demonstrating his completion of the 360 hours of community service. Wake
then petitioned this court for special action relief.

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 WAKE v. STATE
Opinion of the Court

JURISDICTION

¶6 Accepting special action jurisdiction is within our discretion,
“unless a statute or an order requires” us to accept jurisdiction. Ariz. R.P.
Spec. Act. 12(a). In employing that discretion, we determine “whether
remedy by appeal is equally plain, speedy, and adequate.” Id. “[B]ecause
the interpretation of statutes and court rules is a matter of law reviewed de
novo, cases presenting such issues are ‘particularly appropriate for review
by special action.’” Yauck v. W. Town Bank & Tr., 259 Ariz. 481, 485, ¶ 12
(App. 2025) (citing Sierra Tucson, Inc. v. Lee ex rel. County of Pima, 230 Ariz.
255, 257, ¶ 7 (App. 2012)).

¶7 Under A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(5), an appeal may be taken from
“[a]n order that denied the defendant’s ability to petition the court to seal
the defendant’s case records pursuant to § 13-911 if the sole basis for the
appeal is the defendant’s eligibility to petition the court.” But the superior
court did not deny Wake’s petition. It also did not make any findings on
Wake’s eligibility to petition. Instead, the court dismissed the petition for
not providing sufficient information on the completion of community
service hours.

¶8 Because the petition was dismissed, the conditions of A.R.S.
§ 13-4033(A)(5) allowing an appeal are not met. See State v. Dies, 1 CA-CR
25-0317, 2026 WL 534630, at *1, ¶ 8 (Ariz. App. Feb. 26, 2026) (mem.
decision) (“Based on [A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(5)’s] plain language, there are
three prerequisites to [appellate] jurisdiction: (1) the court denied the
petition (2) the order denied the ‘defendant's eligibility to petition’ and (3)
the ‘sole basis for the appeal is the defendant’s eligibility to petition[.]’”)
(last alteration in original). Because Wake has no remedy by appeal, we
exercise our discretion to accept jurisdiction of this special action.

DISCUSSION

¶9 Wake argues the superior court erred in interpreting A.R.S.
§ 13-911 as requiring him to complete his community service hours. We
review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Luviano, 255 Ariz.
225, 227, ¶ 7 (2023). When interpreting statutes, “we give words their
ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a
different meaning is intended.” Id. at 228, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks
omitted). We defer to the superior court’s factual findings and will affirm
them if they are supported by reasonable evidence. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v.
Burke, 204 Ariz. 251, 254, ¶ 10 (2003).

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 WAKE v. STATE
Opinion of the Court

¶10 The sealing of criminal records is governed by A.R.S. § 13-911.
As a preliminary matter, we note an internal inconsistency in § 13-911.
Section 13-911(A)(1) states that a person may petition to seal records if the
person “completed all of the terms and conditions of the sentence that was
imposed by the court.” (Emphasis added). But § 13-911(E) states that a
person may petition to seal records “after the person completes all of the
nonmonetary terms and conditions of the person’s sentence ordered by the
court, and the following period of time has passed since the person
completed the nonmonetary conditions of probation or sentence and was
discharged by the court.” (Emphasis added). Section 13-911(E) thus
addresses the records of those who were placed on probation, while
subsection (A) only mentions those who had a sentence imposed. See State
v. Muldoon, 159 Ariz. 295, 298 (1988) (“Probation is not a sentence.”). Neither
party argues that this inconsistency renders probationers ineligible to seal
their records or otherwise affects the analysis here.

¶11 In interpreting a statute’s plain language, we review “the
entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same
subject.” State v. Serrato, 259 Ariz. 493, 496, ¶ 9 (2025) (citing Nicaise v.
Sandaram, 245 Ariz. 566, 568, ¶ 11 (2019)). And we “avoid construing a
statute in a manner that leads to an absurd result.” France v. Indus. Comm'n,
250 Ariz. 487, 490, ¶ 13 (2021). Reading the statute as permitting those
sentenced to seal their records while prohibiting those placed on probation
from doing so is absurd. See State v. Smith, 112 Ariz. 416, 419 (1975)
(discussing probation as a “sentencing alternative” for less serious
offenders who can be rehabilitated without incarceration). We therefore
conclude the omission of the word probation from subsection (A) was not
meant to preclude the statute’s application to those placed on probation.

¶12 Under § 13-911(E)(2), a person convicted of an eligible Class 4
felony offense may petition to seal his criminal records five years “after the
person completes all of the nonmonetary terms and conditions of the
person’s sentence ordered by the court” and the person’s sentence or
probation “was discharged by the court.” The statute also requires the
petitioner “to have paid all fines, fees and restitution ordered by the court
at the time of filing the petition.” Id. at (G).

¶13 Wake argues his discharge from probation served as an
acknowledgment that he “completed” the nonmonetary conditions of his
probation. In so arguing, he points out that other statutes require
“successful” completion of probation conditions, while § 13-911 only
requires completion. See A.R.S. §§ 13-604(C) (allowing designation of an
undesignated offense as a misdemeanor “on the defendant’s successful

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 WAKE v. STATE
Opinion of the Court

fulfillment of the conditions of probation” (emphasis added)), -3821(G)
(allowing termination of the requirement to register as a sex offender “on
successful completion of probation” if the defendant was under 18 when the
offense was committed (emphasis added)).

¶14 We are not persuaded by Wake’s argument. Section 13-911
sets forth four prerequisites for a person to petition to seal records: (1) the
person must “complete[] all of the nonmonetary terms and conditions” of
the person’s sentence, (2) the person’s probation or sentence must be
“discharged by the court,” (3) a period of years (based on the severity of the
offense) must have passed since the completion of prerequisites (1) and (2),
and (4) the person must have “paid all fines, fees and restitution.” Id. at (E),
(G).

¶15 Section 13-911(E)’s plain language requires nonmonetary
conditions of probation—including community service hours—be
complete before the petitioner may petition to seal records. See Luviano, 255
Ariz. at 228, ¶ 10. For Wake to petition, five years must have passed since
he completed all 360 hours of community service and was discharged from
probation. See A.R.S. § 13-911(E). Although he paid his monetary restitution
and was discharged from probation, a nonmonetary condition of his
probation—community service—was not complete.

¶16 Reading the statute as just requiring discharge from
probation renders subsection 13-911(E)’s requirement that a person
“complete[] all nonmonetary terms and conditions” of probation
superfluous. See Nicaise, 245 Ariz. at 568, ¶ 11 (“A cardinal principle of
statutory interpretation is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and
provision so that no word or provision is rendered superfluous.”). When
Wake petitioned, he had not completed all nonmonetary probation
conditions. Therefore, he had not fulfilled the prerequisites of § 13-911.

¶17 Wake also argues that the superior court cannot require Wake
to complete his community service after being discharged from probation.
Cf. State v. Dean, 226 Ariz. 47, 51, ¶ 11 (App. 2010) (“[T]he court maintained
jurisdiction over [defendant] throughout the period of his probation.”). But
the court did not order Wake to complete his community service hours, it
requested proof of completion of 360 hours to establish his eligibility to seal
criminal records.

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 WAKE v. STATE
Opinion of the Court

¶18 Wake has not shown that the court abused its discretion in
dismissing his petition to seal records.

CONCLUSION

¶19 We accept special action jurisdiction and deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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